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1. Explain the problem of appearance and reality, illustrating your account with two example from everyday life and two philosophical examples, and explain where you think the burden of proof lies with respect things that pre-philosophically appear to us to be true.
3. Define theism, explain the modal ontological argument for theism, and explain what you take to be the best single objection to this argument.
Theism is the belief in a perfect being, especially as the instrumental force in the creation of the universe. The Modal Ontological Argument presents a case for theism based on probability and necessity that infers the God’s existence through reflections on God’s nature.
Its main premises are two metaphysical assumptions: a perfect being is possible and necessary existence, or existence in all possible worlds, is a perfection.From the first assumption it follows modally that if a necessarily perfect being is possible then it must exist in some possible world and would retain all its properties deemed essential in said world. With the synthesis of the second metaphysical assumption one deduces that said essentially perfect being exists and has the great-making quality of necessary existence in some possible world. If something is necessarily existent then it is necessary that it exist in all possible worlds, therefore a being that essentially contains all perfections must exist in all possible worlds. It is a modal principle that if something exists in all possible worlds then it exists, which leads to the conclusion that an essentially perfect being, which we may call God, must exist.
As a whole, the Modal Ontological Argument seems to depend on the seemingly indubitable states of affairs illustrated by its two metaphysical assumptions, and in what seems to be the most comprehensive rejoinder to this argument, what he calls the “Knowno” objection, Peter Van Inwagen casts doubt on the first of the two assumptions. The “Knowno” objection finds fault with the assumption that a perfect being is possible due to the unfeasible task in proving otherwise with the utmost certainty. To illustrate this, Van Inwagen creates an abstract being called a “Knowno” which believes truly that a perfect being does not exist. Van Inwagen then suggests a parallel to the original assumption in question by stating that a “Knowno” is also possible. Like the perfect being, a “Knowno” is a concept not easily denied and although it may seem farfetched it actually offers no more absurdity than the concept of a perfect being. Alas, this causes a crisis in conjunction with the Modal Ontological Argument because if a “Knowno” is possible there can be no perfect being. If a “Knowno” is concluded possible because it is illogical to say otherwise (much in the same way a perfect being is possible), then it must, by definition, exist in some possible world. A perfect being, which according to the Modal Ontological Argument must exist in all possible worlds, cannot exist in a world where the “Knowno” exists, and therefore, cannot exist in all possible worlds. There will always be one possible world where the “Knowno” exists and the perfect being can not, which means the perfect being is impossible, but every possible world must have a perfect being in it, which renders the “Knowno” impossible. Van Inwagen’s very introduction of the “Knowno” as a parallel creates an endless paradox of the implications of the Modal Ontological Argument, thus rendering it logically weak.
thirty minutes left.
make that fifteen. |
